The FTC imposed a fine

In June 2003, a California jury found a warehouse lender and securitization underwriter liable in part for fraud on consumers committed by a lender to whom it provided financing and underwriting services. The jury found that the investment bank was aware of the fraud and substantially assisted the lender in perpetrating the fraud by providing financing and underwriting services that allowed the lender to continue to operate, and held it liable for 10% of the plaintiff's damages. This is the first case we know of in which an investment bank was held partly responsible for violations committed by a mortgage lender customer. Shortly after the announcement of the jury verdict in the California case, the Florida Attorney General filed suit against the same financial institution, seeking an injunction to prevent it from financing mortgage loans within Florida, as well as damages and civil penalties, based on theories of unfair and deceptive trade practices and fraud. The suit claims that this financial institution aided and abetted the same lender involved in the California case in its commission of fraudulent representations in Florida. As of the date of this filing, there has been no ruling in this case. If other courts or regulators adopt this "aiding and abetting" theory, investment banks may face increased litigation as they are named as defendants in lawsuits and regulatory actions against the mortgage companies with which they do business. Some investment banks may exit the business, charge more for warehouse lending and reduce the prices they pay for whole-loans in order to build in the costs of this potential litigation. This could, in turn, have a material adverse effect on our results of operations, financial condition and business prospects.

We may be subject to fines or other penalties based upon the conduct of our independent brokers.

Mortgage brokers, from which we source some of our Tribeca loans, have parallel and separate legal obligations to which they are subject. While these laws may not explicitly hold the originating lenders responsible for the legal violations of mortgage brokers, increasingly federal and state agencies have sought to impose such assignee liability. For example, the FTC entered into a settlement agreement with a mortgage lender where the FTC characterized a broker that had placed all of its loan production with a single lender as the "agent" of the lender. The FTC imposed a fine on the lender in part because, as "principal," the lender was legally responsible for the mortgage broker's unfair and deceptive acts and practices. In the past, the United States Department of Justice has sought to hold a non- prime mortgage lender responsible for the pricing practices of its mortgage brokers, alleging that the mortgage lender was directly responsible for the total fees and charges paid by the borrower under the Fair Housing Act even if the lender neither dictated what the mortgage broker could charge nor kept the money for its own account. Accordingly, we may be subject to fines or other penalties based upon the conduct of our independent mortgage broker customers.

We are subject to significant legal and reputational risks and expenses under federal and state laws concerning privacy, use and security of customer information.

The federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial reform legislation imposes significant privacy obligations on us in connection with the collection, use and security of financial and other nonpublic information provided to us by applicants and borrowers. In addition, California has enacted, and several other states are considering enacting, even more stringent privacy or customer-information-security legislation, as permitted under federal law. Because laws and rules concerning the use and protection of customer information are continuing to develop at the federal and state levels, we expect to incur increased costs in our effort to be and remain in full compliance with these requirements. Nevertheless, despite our efforts we will be subject to legal and reputational risks in connection with our collection and use of customer information, and we cannot assure you that we will not be subject to lawsuits or compliance actions under such state or federal privacy requirements. To the extent that a variety of inconsistent state privacy rules or requirements are enacted, our compliance costs could substantially increase.

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If many of our borrowers become subject to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act of 2003, our cash flows and interest income may be adversely affected.

Under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, which in 2003 re-enacted the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, or the Civil Relief Act, members of the military services on active duty receive certain protections and benefits. Under the Civil Relief Act, a borrower who enters active military service after the origination of his or her mortgage loan generally may not be required to pay interest above an annual rate of 6%, and the lender is restricted from exercising certain enforcement remedies, including foreclosure, during the period of the borrower's active duty status. The Civil Relief Act also applies to a borrower who was on reserve status and is called to active duty after origination of the mortgage loan. Considering the large number of U.S. Armed Forces personnel on active duty and likely to be on active duty in the future, compliance with the Civil Relief Act could reduce our cash flow and the interest payments collected from those borrowers, and in the event of default or delay, prevent us from exercising the remedies for default that otherwise would be available to us.

Risks Related to Our Securities

Thomas J. Axon effectively controls our company, substantially reducing the influence of our other stockholders.

Thomas J. Axon, our Chairman, President and CEO, beneficially owns more than 43% of our outstanding common stock. As a result, Mr. Axon will be able to influence significantly the actions that require stockholder approval, including:

o the election of our directors; and

o the approval of mergers, sales of assets or other corporate transactions or matters submitted for stockholder approval.

Furthermore, the members of the board of directors as a group (including Mr. Axon) beneficially own a substantial majority of our outstanding common stock. As a result, our other stockholders may have little or no influence over matters submitted for stockholder approval. In addition, Mr. Axon's influence and/or that of our current board members could preclude any unsolicited acquisition of us and consequently materially adversely affect the price of our common stock.

Our organizational documents, Delaware law and our credit facility may make it harder for us to be acquired without the consent and cooperation of our board of directors, management and lender.

Several provisions of our organizational documents, Delaware law and our credit facility may deter or prevent a takeover attempt, including a takeover attempt in which the potential purchaser offers to pay a per share price greater than the current market price of our common stock.

Our classified board of directors will make it more difficult for a person seeking to obtain control of us to do so. Also, our supermajority voting requirements may discourage or deter a person from attempting to obtain control of us by making it more difficult to amend the provisions of our certificate of incorporation to eliminate an anti-takeover effect or the protections they afford minority stockholders, and will make it more difficult for a stockholder or stockholder group to put pressure on our board of directors to amend our certificate of incorporation to facilitate a takeover attempt. In addition, under the terms of our certificate of incorporation, our board of directors has the authority, without further action by the stockholders, to issue shares of preferred stock in one or more series and to fix the rights, preferences, privileges and restrictions thereof. The ability to issue shares of preferred stock could tend to discourage takeover or acquisition proposals not supported by our current board of directors.